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The country that first controls and dominates emerging technologies such as 
artificial intelligence and quantum computing will have the power to re-shape the 
world to their benefit. The US federal government has historically been the source 
of breakthroughs in technology and science, but Silicon Valley now controls much 
of the technology development needed for future defense and weapons systems. 
Driven by profit, the private sector has been more open to dealing new technologies 
to foreign adversaries while the US national security apparatus has a vested 
interest in ensuring powerful new technologies remain unattainable to countries 
that may wish harm to the United States. This paper recommends changes to export 
laws to specifically address the quick pace of sensitive technological development 
in the private sector, and it advocates for new statutory authority to seize 
technology through eminent domain as a last resort.
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HAWLEY: So I just want to make sure that I understand exactly what 
you’re saying. You’re telling me that Google, an American 
company, supposedly, is refusing to work with the Department of 
Defense, but is doing work with China, in China, in a way that at 
least indirectly benefits the Chinese government. Is that correct? 
 
SHANAHAN: I haven’t heard the word refuse, but there’s a lack of 
willingness to support DOD programs.  
 
HAWLEY: General you’re nodding your head; do you want to weigh 
in on this? 
 
DUNFORD: You know Senator I’m nodding my head on exactly the 
point that you made that the work that Google is doing in China is 
indirectly benefitting the Chinese military. And I’ve been very public 
on this issue as well in fact the way I described it to our industry 
partners is “look, we’re the good guys in the values that we 
represent and the system that we represent is the one that will allow 
and has allowed you to thrive” and that’s the way I’ve characterized 
it. I was just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the 
general sense of all of us as leaders. We watch with great concern 
when industry partners work in China knowing there is that indirect 
benefit, and frankly “indirect” may be not a full characterization of 





 In living memory, the U.S. government has operated with a global 
technological advantage. Our current advantage relies on access to advanced 
technology developed by private industries—while simultaneously limiting our 
adversaries’ access to that same technology.2 The government cannot take a laissez 
faire approach and hope that the status quo will hold. Unless existing export control 
regulations are strengthened, and a new eminent domain authority is enacted, the 
 
1Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Budget Posture in Review of the 
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Armed Services, 116th Cong. 83-84 (2019) (statement of General 
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., United States Marine Corps 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
2 See David Shepardson, U.S. tightening restrictions on Huawei access to technology, 
chips, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech/u-s-
tightening-restrictions-on-huawei-access-to-technology-chips-idUSKCN25D1CC. 
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United States risks losing its advantage and becoming beholden to Silicon Valley’s 
whims. 
 
 The consequences of losing are clear: whoever controls emerging 
technologies like artificial intelligence (“AI”) and quantum computers (“QC”) will 
have the power to re-shape the world to their benefit. “Artificial intelligence is the 
future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal 
opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the 
leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”3 
 
 The private sector is the new driver of innovation for technology with 
national security implications. This is a major shift away from the historical model 
of the federal government funding research that guided the cutting edge.4  On 
October 23, 2019, Mr. Michael Brown, director of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Defense Innovation Unit noted that:  
 
[A] lack of U.S. government investment is part of the 
problem.  Sixty years ago, most of the country’s 
technology innovation was supported by the military. 
But the government’s investment has been on a 
steady decline since the 1960s . . . . That leaves 
technology for defense and weapons systems, and 
humanitarian and disaster relief, to Silicon Valley.5   
 
 When the federal government played a greater role in technological 
development, they also had greater control over how new technology was dispersed 
and used. Now that the government is more of a customer than a creator, the tech 
behemoths act as the gatekeepers.6  But, unlike the federal government, Silicon 
Valley does not have the same incentive to limit access to emerging technology—
 
3'Whoever leads in AI will rule the world’: Putin to Russian children on Knowledge Day, RT (Sep. 
1, 2017), https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/.  
4 Caleb Foote & Robert Atkinson, Federal Support for R&D Continues Its Ignominious 
Slide, INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION 
FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/12/federal-support-rd-continues-its-
ignominious-slide. 
5 Heather Somerville, China Has ‘Concerning’ Leads Over U.S. in Tech, Defense Department 
Official Says, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-
concerning-leads-over-u-s-in-tech-defense-department-official-says-11571856288. 
6  See Scott Rosenburg, Tech giants are the new gatekeepers,  
 AXIOS (Feb. 1, 2019) https://www.axios.com/tech-giants-new-gatekeepers-1548976974-
25f26494-a67c-4252-9c18-418588f8de06.html. 




companies see new technology through the lens of profit, while the federal 
government see through the lens of national security.   
 
 Recently, private U.S. companies have shown a willingness to do business 
with foreign competitors and a reluctance to do business with their own 
government.7 In 2017, Google reentered the Chinese market after a seven-year 
absence by opening an artificial intelligence development center.8 At the same 
time, Google chose not to renew a contract with the DoD.9 Once the DoD contract 
with Google that was up for renewal became public, Google employees revolted.10 
They sent a letter to Google’s CEO, Mr. Sundar Pichai, arguing “that Google should 
not be in the business of war. Therefore we ask that Project Maven be canceled, 
and that Google draft, publicize and enforce a clear policy stating that neither 
Google nor its contractors will ever build warfare technology.” 11  Google 
capitulated, and did not renew the Project Maven contract. 12 One of America’s 
largest technology companies, the global leader of AI development, opened an AI 
center in China but limited its AI business with the United States.13  It is this 
dichotomy that that must be reckoned with. 
 
 The paper begins by outlining the emerging technologies at issue, mainly 
AI and QC (Part II). This paper then discusses the current state of export control 
laws, and makes recommends that those laws need to be upgraded to keep pace 
with technological development (Part III). This paper concludes by exploring the 
concept of eminent domain, bounded by the Fifth Amendment, as applied to 
emerging technology. This paper argues for new statutory authority to seize 
 
7 Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work 
for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html. 
8 Carlos Tejada, Google, Looking to Tiptoe Back into China, Announces A.I. Center, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/business/google-ai-china.html. 
9  Daisuke Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset 
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-
pentagon-project-maven.html.  
10 Id.  
11 Google should not be in business of war, say employees, BBC (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43656378 (noting that Project Maven was a Department of 
Defense (DoD) contract held by Google, in which the DoD used Google’s image recognition 
artificial intelligence (AI) to search for targets of potential military significance in satellite 
imagery).  
12 Sundar Pichai, AI at Google: our principles, GOOGLE BLOG (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/. 
13Cheang Ming, Google is blocked in China, but that’s not stopping it from opening an A.I. center 
there, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/13/alphabets-google-opens-china-
ai-centre.html. 
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technology using eminent domain as a last resort (Part IV). If the United Sates limits 
our adversaries’ access to American made emerging technology, while 
guaranteeing that the U.S. government will always have access to that technology, 
as the age-old maxim says, we can have our cake and eat it too. First, let’s turn to 
the technology. 
 
II. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
 
 In August 2018, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019, Congress enacted the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA).14 
The ECRA authorizes the Department of Commerce to “establish appropriate 
controls” on “emerging and foundational technologies” that are essential to the 
“national security of the U.S.” 15  The ECRA does not define what constitutes 
“emerging and foundational technologies,” the ECRA leaves that to an interagency 
process.16 In December 2018, the Department of Commerce published an advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking requesting comments on,  “criteria for identifying 
emerging technologies that are essential to U.S. national security.”17   
 
 For two years, the Department of Commerce took no action. On January 6, 
2020, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued its first interim final rule 
which “amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to make certain 
items subject to the EAR and to impose a license requirement for the export and 
reexport of those items to all destinations, except Canada.”18 Specifically, this rule 
restricts export, without a license, for “[g]eospatial imagery ‘software’ ‘specially 
designed’ for training a Deep Convolutional Neural Network to automate the 
analysis of geospatial imagery and point clouds . . . .”19 The 2018 advance notice 
of proposed rulemaking identified fourteen categories of interest. 20  The 2020 
interim final rule is the first rule to come out of the advanced notice of proposed 
 
14 50 U.S.C.A. § 4801 (2018). 
15 50 U.S.C.A. § 4817(b) (2018). 
16 50 U.S.C.A. § 4817(a) (2018). 
17 DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., R. OF CONTROLS FOR CERTAIN EMERGING TECH. 
(2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2018-0024-0001 (stating that merging 
technologies are considered essential to U.S. national security “because they have potential 
conventional weapons, intelligence collection, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorist 
applications or could provide the United States with a qualitative military or intelligence 
advantage . . . .”). 
18 Addition of Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the 
Export Control Classification Number 0Y521 Series, 85 Fed. Reg. 459 (proposed Jan. 6, 2020) 
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 774). 
19 Id. (discussing the technology underpinning Google’s Project Maven). 
20 DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., supra note 17. 




rulemaking and only addresses one category.21 Two years, one problem addressed, 
thirteen to go. 
 
A. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 The DoD defines AI as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that 
normally require human intelligence—for example, recognizing patterns, learning 
from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action—
whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems.”22 
In the 1950s, when AI was first theorized, the goal was to “mimic human 
cogn[ition]” by allowing a system to learn from its own experiences and make 
decisions based on reasoning.23 
  
 Today, AI encompasses a broad swath of modern computing types, from 
seemingly simple optical character recognition, to machine learning, and up to yet-
to-be-realized human-level AI.24 Both the United States and China have identified 
AI development as a strategic main effort. The United States has recognized that 
“[t]o maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging 
technologies critical to economic growth and security, such as data science, 
encryption, . . . advanced computing technologies, and artificial intelligence.” 25 
The White House has requested approximately $350 million in national security-
related AI funding for fiscal year 2020, out of a total budget request for $973 million 
in AI research and development funding spread across 28 agencies.26 
  
 
21 Addition of Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the 
Export Control Classification Number 0Y521 Series, 85 Fed. Reg. 459 (proposed Jan. 6, 2020) 
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 774). 
22  U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEP’T OF DEF. ARTIFICIAL INTEL. STRATEGY: 
HARNESSING AI TO ADVANCE OUR SEC. AND PROSPERITY 5 (2019), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-
STRATEGY.PDF.   




25  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (2017), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1043812.pdf.   
26  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. RESEARCH 
AND DEV. PROGRAM SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S FY2020 BUDGET 10 (Sept. 2019),  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FY2020-NITRD-AI-RD-Budget-
September-2019.pdf.   
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 Like the United States, China is making direct strategic investments in 
developing the next generation of technology, including AI. 27  In 2017, China 
announced that by 2030, it plans to “become the world's major artificial intelligence 
innovation center.”28 China’s efforts will focus on research areas including big 
data, cross-media perception computing, hybrid augmented intelligence, swarm 
intelligence, autonomous collaborative control, brain-like intelligent computing, 
and quantum intelligent computing.29 China has backed that plan with a $30-billion 
venture capital fund.30   
 
 Unlike the United States, China goes beyond legitimate direct investment 
in research and development and persistently engages in nation state-level 
intellectual property theft to fuel its ambitious 2030 goal of leapfrogging the United 
States.31  “Chinese industrial policy seeks to ‘introduce, digest, absorb, and re-
innovate’ technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world. This 
policy is carried out through state-sponsored IP theft through physical theft, cyber-
enabled espionage and theft, evasion of U.S. export control laws, and counterfeiting 
and piracy. . . .”32 
 
 Despite direct U.S. and Chinese government investment, and Chinese theft, 
the private sector is driving AI innovation: “tech behemoths like Google, Microsoft, 
IBM and Apple, [in] the United States is where the bulk of A.I. innovation has taken 
place.” 33  Chinese companies like “Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, [are] moving 
rapidly to close the gap.”34 
 
27 Major Andrew S. Bowne, Innovation Acquisition Practices in the Age of AI, ARMY LAW., no. 1, 
2019, 74, 76, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/01-2019.pdf.   
28 St. Council on Issuing Notification of New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development 
Planning, ST. COUNCIL (2017) (China), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-
07/20/content_5211996.htm. 
29 Id. 
30 China Sets Up 30 Bln-dollar State Venture Capital Fund, CHINA.ORG.CN (Aug. 18, 
2016), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2016-08/18/content_39120255.htm (China.org.cn is the 
authorized government portal site to China and is under the auspices of the State Council 
Information Office and the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) in Beijing). 
31 See WHITE HOUSE, HOW CHINA’S ECON. AGGRESSION THREATENS THE TECH. AND INTEL. PROP. 
OF THE U.S. AND THE WORLD (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf. 
32 Id. 
33 Vikram Barhat, China is Determined to Steal A.I. Crown From US and Nothing, Not Even a 
Trade War, Will Stop it, CNBC (May 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/04/china-aims-to-
steal-us-a-i-crown-and-not-even-trade-war-will-stop-it.html. 
34 Id. 




The stakes are high. The DoD has acknowledged that “[f]ailure to adopt AI will 
result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people. . . .”35 The United 
States has a strategic interest in maintaining an AI advantage over countries like 
China, but the United States cannot become myopic in its focus on AI. Both AI and 
QC are synergetic, as “Google’s long-term strategy is to use quantum computers 
for machine-learning applications.”36 Quantum computing is an equally disruptive 
technology on the verge of real-world applications. 
 
B. QUANTUM COMPUTERS 
 
 Quantum computers are an alternative to existing classical computers. 
Current desktop computers, smartphones, and supercomputers all work the same 
way. They sequentially process individual bits of data coded as either a 1 or a 0 by 
turning switches called transistors on or off.37 
 
 By contrast, quantum computers hurtle through calculations 
instantaneously, with each quantum bit, or qubit, able to represent data as both zero 
and one, permitting two simultaneous calculations.  The more qubits, the greater 
the computing power . . . . [A] 300-qubit system could in an instant ‘run more 
calculations than there are atoms in the universe.’38 
 
 U.S. companies like Google, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and Lockheed Martin 
are all developing QC technology. 39  Foreign companies like Baidu, Hitachi, 
 
35 U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPT. OF DEF. ARTIFICIAL INTEL. STRATEGY: 
HARNESSING AI TO ADVANCE OUR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY 5 (2019), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-
STRATEGY.PDF. 
36  Charles Q. Choi, Qubit Revolution, ASEE PRISM, Jan. 2017, at 22, 27. 
37 Id. at 25. For a more detailed explanation of quantum computing and how it is revolutionizing 
business, see Quantum Computing Is Coming, Bit by Quibit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/science/quantum-computer-physics-qubits.html. 
38 Choi, supra note 36. 
39 Quantum, GOOGLE RESEARCH, https://research.google/teams/applied-science/quantum/ (last 
visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Starts Here, IBM Q, https://www.ibm.com/quantum-computing/ 
(last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computing, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/quantum/ (last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computing, INTEL, 
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/research/quantum-computing.html (last visited Dec 16, 
2019); Quantum Computing: Spot-Checking Millions of Lines of Code, LOCKHEED MARTIN, 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2017/quantum-computing-spot-checking-
millions-lines-code.html (last visited Dec 16, 2019). 
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Fujitsu, and D-Wave are also developing their own QC technology. 40 The U.S.,41 
China, Russia, and the European Union are all investing billions of dollars into 
developing quantum technology.42 In July 2019, Google announced a milestone in 
quantum computing, in a proof of concept called “quantum supremacy.” 43 
Quantum supremacy is the point at which a quantum computer can perform a 
calculation that would be impossible for a classical computer.44 Google claims that 
their “Sycamore processor takes about 200 seconds to sample one instance of a 
quantum circuit a million times—our benchmarks currently indicate that the 
equivalent task for a state-of-the-art classical supercomputer would take 
approximately 10,000 years.” 45  While practical QC is likely years away, the 
potential for disruption is undeniable. 
 
 Quantum computing can be both a sword and a shield. Like a sword, QC 
could solve the complex algorithms that encrypt billions of daily banking and 
online transactions.46 “In theory, quantum computers could ace complex problems 
that stymie even the strongest supercomputers, such as factoring numbers that are 
hundreds of digits long—an ability that could crack encryption. . . .”47 The National 
Security Agency grew concerned enough that it has partnered with the National 
 
40 Quantum Computing, BAIDU RESEARCH, http://research.baidu.com/Research_Areas/index-
view?id=75 (last visited Dec 16, 2019); Quantum Computer, HITACHI, 
https://www.hitachi.com/rd/portal/glossary/q/quantum_computer.html (last visited Dec 16, 2019); 
Digital Annealer, FUJITSU, https://www.fujitsu.com/global/digitalannealer/ (last visited Dec 16, 
2019); Practical Quantum Computing, DWAVE, https://www.dwavesys.com (last visited Dec 16, 
2019). 
41 OSTP Leads Implementation of the National Quantum Initiative Act, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.energy.gov/articles/ostp-leads-implementation-national-quantum-
initiative-act. 
42 Michael J. Biercuk & Richard Fontaine, The Leap Into Quantum Technology: A Primer For 
National Security Professionals, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-technology-primer-national-security-
professionals/. 
43 Frank Arute et al., Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor, 
574 NATURE 505, 505 (2019) (https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1666-5). 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; but see Jordan Novet, IBM and Google disagree on quantum computing achievement, 
CNBC (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/google-quantum-computing-
supremacy-claim-disputed-by-ibm.html (explaining IBM’s disagreement with Google’s assertion 
and disagreeing with the 10,000-year calculation). 
46 Choi, supra note 36, at 24. 
47 Id. at 26. 




Institute of Standards and Technology to evaluate new post-quantum era encryption 
algorithms.48 
 
 As a shield, QC can make theoretically unbreakable encryption.49 “The 
most prevalent approach is known as quantum key distribution (QKD), through 
which cryptographic keys are exchanged in quantum states through entanglement. 
In accordance with the ‘no cloning’ theorem, quantum information cannot be 
copied, and any attempted interference or eavesdropping within a quantum system 
can be readily detected.”50 Quantum cryptography offers the promise that if a third 
party intercepts a communication, the very act of intercepting the communication 
alters the quantum state of the communication link, thus alerting operators that the 
communication is not secure.51 
 
 The national security implications of performing at the speed of computer 
processing, defeating all existing encryption, and unbreakably secure 
communications are profound. Thankfully, the United States has laws and 
regulations to mitigate the spread of valuable yet risky technology—arms control. 
  
III. CYBER ARMS CONTROL 
 
 The United States employs a two-tier arms control framework to control the 
export of sensitive technology. The Department of State controls weapons exports 
through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).52 The Department of Commerce 
controls the export of dual-use technology through the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR).53 Neither the AECA nor the EAR has been updated to address 
the threat of exporting U.S. innovation in areas like AI or QC. The President, acting 
through the Departments of State and Commerce, has the statutory and regulatory 
authority to designate defense articles, defense services, or dual-use items that have 
 
48 NSA Cybersecurity Perspectives on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography’, 
NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, (Oct. 26, 2020) https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-
Stories/Article-View/Article/2394053/nsa-cybersecurity-perspectives-on-quantum-key-
distribution-and-quantum-cryptogr)/. 
49 Elsa B. Kania & John K. Costello, Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge 





52 22 U.S.C.A. § 2751 (West 2014). 
53 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2019). 
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both civilian and military applications.54  Export control licensing requirements 
should apply to both AI and QC. 
 
A.  ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT 
 
 The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 authorizes the President to “control 
the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide 
foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and 
import of such articles and services.”55 Any item that the President designates under 
the AECA “shall constitute the United States Munitions List.”56 The United States 
Munitions List (USML) is the comprehensive list of what defense articles and 
services are subject to AECA export controls. Exporting any item listed on the 
USML, triggers the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which is the 
U.S. regulatory regime to “ensur[e] commercial exports of defense articles and 
defense services advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”57 
 
 Both the USML and ITAR are managed by the Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls (DDTC) within the Department of State. Before exporting an item listed 
on the USML, the individual or business must obtain an export license from the 
DDTC.58 Exporting a listed item, without a license, is a criminal offense punishable 
with a $1,000,000 fine per instance, or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, 
or both.59 The Secretary of State may also assess civil penalties up to $500,000 for 
each violation.60 
 
 The USML covers twenty-one categories of defense articles and services, 
ranging from shotguns to nuclear weapons. The USML does not designate AI or 
QC as defense articles or services.61 But, in 2014 ITAR was updated to include the 
firmware and software running the items listed on the USML as falling under the 
same licensing requirements as the listed item.62 In practice, this is only a partially 
 
54 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2014); 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2019). 
55 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2014). 
56 Id. For more explanation on the process of designating an item under the United States 
Munitions Lists (USML), see Kathryn Toomey, What Experts Need to Know About the U.S. 
Munitions List (USML), INT’L TRADE BLOG (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.shippingsolutions.com/blog/what-exporters-need-to-know-about-the-us-munitions-
list-usml.  
57.  Robert L. Hobart, DDTC: Evaluating U.S. Defense Exports in 2020, DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.state.gov/ddtc-elevating-u-s-defense-exports-in-2020/. 
58 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(1)(a)(ii)(III) (West 2014). 
59 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(c) (West 2014). 
60 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(e) (West 2014). 
61 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2020). 
62 22 C.F.R. § 120.45 (2020) (adding to the ITAR). 




effective control. It does not place any practical limits on commercial companies 
exporting AI and QC, so long as they are not related to a listed defense article. 
Companies have an incentive to not incorporate their technology into defense 
articles listed on the USML to avoid ITAR licensing requirements. 
 
 There is precedent to use the USML to limit the export of technology with 
similar national security equities that AI and QC present today. For example, from 
World War II until 1996, nearly all cryptography was listed on the USML and 
required an export license under ITAR.63 Though unlike cryptography from the 
mid-20th century, AI and QC straddle military and commercial enterprises.64  The 
EAR fills the regulatory gap for technology that is neither solely military nor solely 
commercial. 
 
B.  EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 
 
 The Department of Commerce, through the BIS implements the EAR.65  
The EAR, like the ITAR, requires individuals or businesses to obtain a license 
before exporting certain items listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL).66  The 
restrictions of the EAR are: 
 
intended to serve the national security, foreign 
policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and other interests of the U.S, . . .  [s]ome 
controls are designed to restrict access to items 
subject to the EAR by countries or persons that might 
apply such items to uses inimical to U.S. interests.67 
 
The EAR generally applies to dual-use items:  “[a] ‘dual-use’ item is one that has 
civil applications as well as terrorism and military or weapons of mass destruction 
 
63 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995) (including cryptography before changing in 1996); see Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *1 , *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
19, 2004);  Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at 
*1 , *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004); Tamotsu Aoi, Historical Background of Export Control and 
Development in Selected Countries and Regions, INT’L SEC. TRADE CONTROL DEP. 12 (2016), 
https://www.cistec.or.jp/english/service/report/1605historical_background_export_control_develo
pment.pdf.   
64 See generally Andrew P. Hunter et al., Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The 
Importance of the AI Ecosystem, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, 2018, at 3; Kania & 
Costello, supra note 49 at 3. 
65 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2020). 
66 See 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (2020). 
67 15 C.F.R. § 730.6 (2020). 
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(WMD)-related applications.” 68  The CCL, like the USML, is a list of  items 
requiring an export license under the EAR.69 The items on the CCL are dual-use.70 
 
 Unlike the USML, the CCL is expansive, spanning 751 pages—compared 
to the USML’s paltry 107 pages. The CCL also incorporates detailed technical 
specifications to define the scope of what is covered.71 Also, unlike the USML, the 
CCL does contain some controls on computer technology that could encompass AI 
and QC.72 The question is, are the USML and CCL sufficient to maintain the U.S. 
advantage in emerging technologies like AI and QC? 
 
 1. EXPORT CONTROLS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 There are some export controls on AI, but they are inadequate for the next 
generation of AIs.  The CCL requires a license to export a type of computer on 
which current AIs operate called “neural computers.” 73  Neural computers are 
“computational devices designed or modified to mimic the behavior of a neuron or 
a collection of neurons, i.e., computational devices which are distinguished by their 
hardware capability to modulate the weights and numbers of the interconnections 
of a multiplicity of computational components based on previous data.” 74  In 
simpler terms, neural computers mimic the way a human brain processes 
information. The export restriction on neural computers only controls the current 
generation of AI, like machine learning algorithms used for tasks like image 
recognition.75 The BIS should expand the scope of the CCL to include AI with 
greater function, and greater risk. 
 
 According to a paper recently published by AI researcher and Google 
software engineer François Chollet, there are three levels of AI.76 The lowest level 
is capable of accomplishing task-specific skills like differentiating between a dog 
 
68 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2020). 
69 See 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (2019). 
70 See Commerce Control List, LEGAL INFO. INST. (2020), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_control_list.  
71 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020). 
72 Id.  
73 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020). 
74 Id. 
75 See generally Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile 
a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-
surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html (discussing algorithms for image 
recognition of members of a Muslim minority group in China).  
76 See François Chollet, On the Measure of Intelligence, ARXIV.ORG (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://arxiv.org/ abs/1911.01547. 




and a cat in an image after being trained on may examples.77 These are AIs with 
“local generalization.”78 “This is the form of generalization that machine learning 
has been concerned with from the 1950s up to this day.”79 The second level is AI 
that can be applied to varied, yet related, tasks without having to be retrained.80 
These are AIs with “broad generalization.” “For instance, a L5 self-driving vehicle, 
or a domestic robot capable of passing Wozniak’s coffee cup test (entering a 
random kitchen and making a cup of coffee) could be said to display broad 
generalization.”81 To date, no AI has achieved broad generalization.82 The highest 
level of AI is one with human-like general intelligence, called “extreme 
generalization.”83 
 
 The CCL-specific restriction on “neural computers” does little to maintain 
our national security advantage, because low-level AI is already widely available.84 
The current CCL only requires a license for AI running on a neural computer.85 The 
CCL should be capability driven, not hardware-architecture driven. The CCL 
should be amended to include AI with broad or extreme generalization as the 
benchmark to trigger an EAR license requirement. A capability-based definition is 
harder for developers to get around and captures what the U.S. should be concerned 
about—losing a comparative advantage for the next generation of AI.   
 
 The Department of Commerce should define what AIs are within the scope 
of the CCL by reference to an AI intelligence test. François Chollet helpfully 
published a formula to measure how intelligent an AI is.86 His formula measures 
 
77 Id. at 11; see also Shane & Wakabayashi, supra note 7 (illustrating an example of low-level, 
task-specific A.I. in Google’s Project Maven). 
78 Chollet, supra note 76. 
79 Chollet, supra note 76; see generally Douglas Heaven, Why Deep-Leaning AIs Are So Easy to 
Fool, NATURE, (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03013-5 (providing an 
in-depth discussion of local generalization AI).   
80 Chollet, supra note 76. 
81 Chollet, supra note 76; see generally Steve Wozniak, Steve Wozniak aka “The Woz,” WOZ.ORG 
(2019), http://www.woz.org/about/ (describing Steve Wozniak, who co-founded Apple with Steve 
Jobs). 
82 Chollet, supra note 76, at 11. 
83 Id.; see generally Editorial, Human-Level AI Is Right Around the Corner—Or Hundreds of 
Years 
Away, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 31, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/humanlevel
-ai-is-right-around-the-corner-or-hundreds-of-years-away (presenting the predictions of 
nine technologists as to when “brainlike” AI computing would become a reality, with responses 
ranging from one decade to four hundred years). 
84 See generally Mozur, supra note 75; Roszel C. Thomsen II, Artificial Intelligence and Export 
Controls: Conceivable, But Counterproductive? 22 J. OF INTERNET L., 17 (2018).   
85 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020);  
86 Chollet, supra note 76, at 39. 
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an AI’s ability to sufficiently accomplish a task using the lowest number of training 
inputs. 87  This formula is a reasonable starting point for the Department of 
Commerce to amend the CCL and bring truly advanced AIs within the regulatory 
scope of the EAR. Using the formula would accomplish the goal of defending our 
national advantage in AI technology, and thus promoting our national security. 
 
 2.  EXPORT CONTROLS ON QUANTUM COMPUTERS 
 
 The CCL should also be amended to control the export of QC technology. 
The CCL has existing restrictions on exporting computers, but not QCs 
specifically. 88  In 2006, the CCL redefined the scope of which computers are 
regulated by implementing a standardized formula called Adjusted Peak 
Performance (APP). 89  Adjusted Peak Performance calculates a computer’s 
processing power in a unit called Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT)90 and is intended to 
also be able to identify high-performance computers (HPC) that can be “used for 
national security applications [to] include vector supercomputers, massively-
parallel processor systems, and proprietary cluster architectures.” 91  The CCL 
restricts the export of HPC that can compute between 16-29 WT.92 For reference, 
the new $50,000 Apple Mac Pro with a 28 core Intel Xeon W processor has a WT 
of 2.4.93  The fastest supercomputer in the world can perform 200,000 trillion 
calculations per second, or 200 petaflops.94 That is equivalent to an APP score of 
between 60,000 and 180,000 WT (depending on how the technical specifications 
of the supercomputer are accounted for in the APP formula).95 
 
 
87 See id. at 39-40. 
88 See 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020) (mentioning no quantum computing).  
89 U.S. Dep’t of Com., Bureau of Industry and Security, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED 




92 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 6 (2020); 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, Cat. 4 (2020). 
93 Chance Miller, Apple’s New Mac Pro Maxes Out at Over $50,000, and Higher Specs are 
Coming, 9 TO 5 MAC, (Dec. 10, 2019), https://9to5mac.com/2019/12/10/mac-pro-max-price/; 
see Export Compliance Metrics for Intel® Microprocessors: Intel® Xeon® Processors, INTEL 
(2020), https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/processors/APP-for-Intel-
Xeon-Processors.pdf. 
94 ORNL Launches Summit Supercomputer, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB’Y (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.ornl.gov/news/ornl-launches-summit-supercomputer. 
95 Indiana University, Understand Measures of Supercomputer Performance and Storage System 
Capacity, KNOWLEDGE BASE (2020), https://kb.iu.edu/d/apeq; A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO 
ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 6-7 (illustrating that the APP applies a 
weighting factor of .3 or .9 depending on the type of processer used. 200 petaflops equal 200,000 
teraflops, so 200,000 x .3 = 60,000, and 200,000 x .9 = 180,000).  




 The fastest supercomputer in the world is subject to the EAR because the 
APP can calculate its WT.96 Meanwhile, Google’s QC which reportedly calculated 
in 200 seconds what would have taken that very same supercomputer 10,000 years 
to calculate is likely not subject to any expert control based on the APP. 97 That is 
because the APP measures the processing capacity in a way that only applies to 
classical, not quantum.98 A quantum computer does not use bits or a traditional 
processor, it solves problems using particles called quibits. 99  The technical 
specifications of QC do not match the inputs for the APP formula.100 Therefore, the 
APP cannot calculate a QC WT.101 The CCL only regulates HPC with a WT over 
a certain threshold, so without a WT, QCs escape regulation. 
 
 Quantum computing has the potential to revolutionize areas like drug 
discovery, but it also has the potential to make current cryptography obsolete.102 
This is a classic example of the dual-use technology that the EAR regulates.103 
However, QC is not regulated by the EAR because the Department of Commerce 
has defined regulated HPC in a way that requires the APP formula to work.  For 
QC, this is a loophole.   
 
 Quantum computing is still in its infancy and no standard benchmark of QC 
performance has emerged on which to base an updated CCL formula. That alone 
may be cause to restrict the export of all QC technology until the technology has 
matured. To maintain the U.S. advantage in HPC, the government should bring QC 
within the scope of the EAR by adding a second benchmark or formula to the CCL 
to account for the unique characteristics of QC. For example, the number of qubits 
a QC uses or a capability-based definition that uses existing HPC capabilities at a 
certain WT benchmark to make an equivalency determination.  
 
96 See ORNL Launches Summit Supercomputer, supra note 94.  
97 Arute, supra note 43, at 505. 
98 A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 4, 6.   
99 Choi, supra note 36, at 25. 
100 A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADJUSTED PEAK PERFORMANCE, supra note 89, at 6 (showing the 
variables in the APP formula as follows: n number of processors in the “digital 
computer,” i processor number, ti processor cycle time, Fi processor frequency, Ri peak floating 
point calculating rate, and Wi architecture adjustment factor).  
101Id. (“For processors not capable of performing calculations on floating-point operands of 64-
bits or more the effective calculating rate R is zero.”). 
102 See generally, Rick Mullin, Let’s Talk About Quantum Computing in Drug Discovery, 
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS (Sept. 13, 2020), 
https://cen.acs.org/business/informatics/Lets-talk-quantum-computing-drug/98/i35; Kania & 
Costello, supra note 49 at 3-4. 
103 DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., supra note 17 (“The Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) controls the export of dual-use and less sensitive military items through the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR).”).  




 Export controls provide a shield for the U.S. to prevent the erosion of the 
U.S. technological advantage. But, what if a U.S. company refuses to contract with 
the government for critical advanced technology needed for military or national 
security purposes?  The Fifth Amendment offers a solution—a sword. 
 
IV. TAKINGS CLAUSE 2.0 
 
 A private company will inevitably develop the next generation of 
technology that is vital to our national defense. It is also foreseeable that a company 
who possesses that technology may be unwilling to contract with the U.S. 
government. 104  The government then must choose between either ceding a 
comparative technological advantage, or compelling the company’s cooperation to 
aid in our national defense. However, without congressional approval, the President 
cannot use the power written into the Constitution to solve this problem.105 
 
A.  THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
 The U.S. Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights, devolves to the 
individual certain inalienable rights. Among them, private property is protected 
against government seizure by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees  individual due process: “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”106 The 
Fifth Amendment protects individual property rights: “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”107 This clause is referred to as the 
“Takings Clause.” 
 
 While the Takings Clause seemingly protects property rights, it is also the 
source of the government’s constitutional authority to take private property from 
the individual for public benefit.108  “The power of eminent domain . . . is an 
essential attribute of sovereignty and has long been recognized as a power of the 
 
104 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Business of War: Google Employees 
Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html.  
105 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585, 87. 
106 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl 3. 
107 U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8. 
108 Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 311 
(2007) (“An overarching principle endlessly quoted in the cases should be highlighted at the 
outset. The Takings Clause, says the Supreme Court, ‘was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 




Federal Government.” 109  The government uses the legal concept of eminent 
domain to exercise this power: “[t]akings law flows from eminent domain: the 
inherent power of the sovereign to take private property, as principally constrained 
by the ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation’ prerequisites of the Takings Clause.”110   
 
 1. PUBLIC USE 
 
 The first constitutional requirement is that a taking be “for public use.”111 
The Supreme Court has held that a taking is for the “public use” when that taking 
serves a “public purpose.”112 Public purposes that may justify the taking of private 
property include “alleviating blight, reducing the concentration of land ownership, 
and promoting economic development[.]” 113  National security as a “public 
purpose” rationale has not been explicitly ruled on by the court. However, national 
security (defense production) was the underlying rationale for the government’s 
attempted seizure of steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., v. Sawyer.114  The 
Supreme Court did not decide if national security was a “public use” in 
Youngstown, and instead decided the case on another issue and ruled against the 
government because the President acted without legislative authority.115 
 
 Courts have largely deferred to the legislature in deciding what constitutes 
a “public purpose.”116 In its most cited eminent domain case, the Supreme Court 
stated, “[f]or more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures 
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power.”117 Simply put, “‘[i]t is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics’ . . 






109 Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co., v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 680 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
110 Meltz, supra note 108, at 310 (footnote omitted). 
111 U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8. 
112 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). 
113 Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 101 (2019) (footnotes omitted). 
114 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. 
115 Id. at 588-89. 
116 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“Judicial deference is required 
because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes 
should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.”). 
117 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. 
118 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)). 
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 2. JUST COMPENSATION 
 
 The second constitutional requirement is that the government pay “just 
compensation.”119  Just compensation is equivalent to the fair market value of what 
was taken.120 This paper does not address what compensation would be fair for the 
most advanced technology ever created. If the situation becomes so dire that the 
government must resort to a coercive power, like the Takings Clause, the pressing 
question will not be money—it will be the authority to act. 
 
 3.  SEIZING TECHNOLOGY 
 
 The Takings Clause is not limited to real property. The government can use 
eminent domain to take private land to build something like a road or a border 
wall.121 The Takings Clause can also be used to seize “tangible and intangible” 
personal property including:  “franchises, money, debts of a lender, liens, most 
contract rights, patents and copyrights, trade secrets, unpatented mining claims, and 
causes of action once reduced to final, unreviewable judgment.”122 
 
 However, this author has yet to find an instance where the government has 
seized technology or its underlying intellectual property using eminent domain. 
While there is no historical example of seizing intellectual property, based on the 
government’s previous seizure of  intangible property, the intellectual property 
underpinning AI and QC is likely subject to seizure if Congress passes specific 
authority for the executive to act. While seizing intellectual property would be 
novel, so was every use of eminent domain to seize a new form of property for the 
public good. 
 
 Over the last century, eminent domain was used for the public’s benefit to 
construct highways, build flood control, and increase electrification of the U.S..123 
The intellectual property underpinning our modern world is as inseparable from the 
public welfare as those public works projects of the past: “[t]oday's public interests 
 
119 U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 8. 
120 U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (footnotes omitted). 
121 See Katie Zezima and Mark Berman, Trump’s wall needs private property. But some Texans 
won’t give up their land without a fight, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trumps-border-wall-would-need-private-property-but-
texas-landowners-plan-to-dig-in-for-lengthy-legal-fight/2019/01/10/d7e4cba8-1443-11e9-803c-
4ef28312c8b9_story.html (discussing government attempts to invoke eminent domain to build a 
border wall, which have resulted in unresolved disputes). 
122 Meltz, supra note 108 at 319-20. 
123 Richard V. Adkisson, Intellectual Property and Eminent Domain: If Ever the Twain Shall 
Meet, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 41, 42 (2002). 




will require that the public be able to acquire the intellectual property it needs, even 
if its owners are unwilling to part with it.”124 Again, when determining whether a 
taking is in the public interest, “‘it is only the taking's purpose, and not its 
mechanics,’ . . . that matters.”125 
 
 Congress has the power to define “public use.”126 If Congress determines 
that the seizure of privately owned advanced technology is in the interest of the 
country’s national security—a public purpose—courts are unlikely to overrule 
Congress’s judgment.127 The Supreme Court has broadly defined what “serves a 
‘public purpose’ . . . [by] reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to 
legislative judgments in this field.”128 In 1952, President Truman attempted to use 
his inherent executive authority to seize private property for a national security 
purpose, but the Supreme Court rebuked him.129 The Court held that the President 
must act with some congressional authority, expressed or implied, to seize property 
under the Constitution. 130 “The President's power . . . must stem either from an act 
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”131 
 
B. NEW STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
 
 The long-held legal axiom, drawn from Youngstown, that the president 
cannot use eminent domain to solve a national security issue is misplaced. The core 
presumption in Youngstown is that if Congress grants the president the authority to 
use eminent domain, the courts will not stand in the way.132 Congress should heed 
history’s warning and authorize the President to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment as a backstop to corporate intransigence. The Declaration of Taking 
Act (DTA) grants the President both the standing authority and a procedural 
mechanism to seize real property.133 Congress should enact analogous legislation 
to the DTA, but for emerging technology. 
 
124 Id. 
125 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482. 
126 Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 244. 
127 See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1582 
(2011) (“The Supreme Court, for its part, has recognized national security as a compelling interest, 
and one with regard to which, in certain setting, deference should be given to the political 
branches.”); see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., INDEP. TASK FORCE REP. NO. 77, INNOVATION 
AND NAT’L SEC.: KEEPING OUR EDGE, 2 (2019) (explaining that “many of advanced technologies 
necessary for national security are developed in the private sector.”). 
128 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
129 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 659. 
130 Id. at 585. 
131 Id. 
132 See also United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946). 
133 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2002). 




 In a recent article, Professor Pollack makes the case for such a statute, the 
Data Taking Act, modeled after the DTA.134 While the likelihood is small that the 
government would be able to convince a private company to sell their technology 
in aid of our national defense, the risk is significant enough that we should establish 
contingent authority. Congress should grant the President eminent domain 
authority, and a mechanism to exercise such authority, modeled on the DTA to 
seize vital technology in the national interest. Even if never used, having the 
authority to unilaterally act would be a powerful incentive for private companies to 
contract with government, or risk having their technology taken. 
 
V. NOT ALL ROSES 
 
 Arms control regulations and eminent domain legislation can and should be 
part of the U.S. national strategy to maintain our strategic technological advantage. 
However, neither of these options should be our first choice. We should continue 
to do what has kept America great: outcompeting the competition. Arms control 
and eminent domain are only appropriate when outcompeting is not enough. Arms 
control is a stop-gap measure to stem the flow of technology transfer. Eminent 
domain forces private enterprise to align with U.S. national security interests. Both 
are blunt-force options, but not long-term solutions.135 
 
A.  EXPORT CONTROL 
 
 Of the two options discussed in this paper, export control regulations are 
the most likely to succeed. They can be tailored and targeted to a specific 
technology.136 They describe what technology is subject to a give restriction using 
detailed technical language and specify to which countries a specific technology 
can and cannot be exported.137 Arms and commerce control regulations are also not 
all that controversial. They have been used for decades.138 
 
 
134 Pollack, supra note 113, at 102 (Professor Pollack’s premise is that the government’s Fifth 
Amendment eminent domain power can achieve what the government’s Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure power has not). 
135 Heather Somerville, China Has ‘Concerning’ Leads Over U.S. in Tech, Defense Department 
Official Says, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-
concerning-leads-over-u-s-in-tech-defense-department-official-says-11571856288. 
136 BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., EXPORT COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES: THE 
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM (2017). 
137 See 15 C.F.R. § 730.8 (2020).  
138 EXPORT COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 136.  




 Nevertheless, export control regulations still carry risk. The main risk being 
that companies will develop technology outside of the United States to avoid export 
controls altogether. The United States’ goal should be to promote the domestic 
development of technology to maintain our global technological advantage. If the 
U.S. erects a closed development system through regulation, that would 
disincentivize companies from creating the next generation of technology in the 
US.  
 
 The U.S. can overcome this catch-22 by using a tiered approach. Only the 
most significant and advanced technology would be subject to strict export controls. 
Technology like QC that is barely more than theoretical can have stringent controls 
will little consequence. Artificial intelligence export controls would require a tiered 
approach. The more advanced the AI the more restrictions are imposed on its 
export. U.S. national security would not benefit from regulating AI that is already 
commercially available. But, for AI that is capable of “broad” or “extreme 
generalization,” the author opines that the advantage gained by stringent export 
controls far outweighs the risk of companies avoiding technology development in 
the US.139 
 
B.  EMINENT DOMAIN 
 
 It is undeniable that eminent domain offers the government a solution to the 
problem identified by this paper. If a company possesses advanced technology but 
restricts government access to it, and that in turn harms the U.S. technological 
advantage, the government can simply use eminent domain to seize that technology. 
It is also undeniable that using eminent domain in such a manner would be opening 
a Pandora’s box. 
 
 If Congress passed a Data Taking Act, and then that legislature was utilized 
to actually seize technology, intellectual property would flee the country and be 
offshored to escape the reach of the U.S.’s long-arm. Thus, defeating the goal of 
the U.S. government’s access to U.S. developed technology. If the U.S. government 
determines that a piece of technology is so vital to the national interest and that the 
only way to gain access to it is through eminent domain, it should act knowing that 






139 Chollet, supra note 76. 





  The United States is the global leader in AT and QC technology, but our 
global competitors are not far behind.140 Maintaining our advantage in emerging 
technologies, like AI and QC, is vital to the U.S. national security interest. 
However, unlike the past, private companies—not the government—are the 
driving force of innovation.141 The government has lost direct control of the 
distribution and use of the technology that is vital to its future.142 But, we have the 
legal tools to confront both problems. 
 
 First, the President, through the Departments of State and Commerce, 
should update existing export control regulations to bring AI and QC within their 
purview.143 These regulations need to catch up with emerging technology. 
Second, Congress should grant the President the authority to seize vital 
technology using the federal government’s eminent domain power under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause.144 Such an authority will prevent a U.S. company’s 
self-interest from overriding the country’s national interest. The United States can 
benefit from private sector innovation while maintaining our global advantage. 








140 Sintia Radu, Despite Chinese Efforts, the U.S. Still Leads in AI, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-08-19/the-us-is-still-
the-global-leader-in-artificial-intelligence. 
141 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CYBERSPACE POL’Y R.: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND 
RESILIENT INFO. AND COMMC’N INFRASTRUCTURE i (2014). 
142 Id. 
143 See infra Appendix A; infra Appendix B. 
144 See infra Appendix C (proposing statutory authority to exercise eminent domain power). 














Appendix A. Artificial Intelligence Export Control Classification Number 




Reason for Control: NS, CC, AT 
 
Control(s) Country Chart (See Supp. No. 1 to part 738) 
NS applies to entire entry NS Column 1 
RS applies to entire entry RS Column 2 
AT applies to entire entry AT Column 1 
 
Reporting Requirements 
See § 743.1 of the EAR for reporting requirements for exports under License Exceptions, and 
Validated End–User authorizations. 
 
List Based License Exceptions (See Part 740 for a Description of All License Exceptions) 
List of Items Controlled 
 
Related Controls: N/A 
 




a. “Artificial Intelligence” shall include “software”, that that is capable of the following: 
 
a.1. “Broad generalization”, adaptation to unknown unknowns across a broad category of 
related tasks; or 
 
a.2. “Human-level generalization”, adaptation to unknown unknowns across an unknown 
range of tasks and domains at or near the level of biological forms of intelligence. 
 
b. “Artificial Intelligence” shall include any component, hardware, firmware, or other unique 
technical capability, working individually or collectively, that allows “software” to achieve 
“broad generalization” or “human-level generalization”. 
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Appendix B.  Quantum Computer Export Control Classification Number 
4D999 Computers as follows (see List of Items Controlled) and “specially designed” related 




Reason for Control: NS, CC, AT 
 
Control(s) Country Chart (See Supp. No. 1 to part 738) 
NS applies to entire entry NS Column 1 
RS applies to entire entry RS Column 2 
AT applies to entire entry AT Column 1 
 
Reporting Requirements 
See § 743.1 of the EAR for reporting requirements for exports under License Exceptions, and 
Validated End–User authorizations. 
 
List Based License Exceptions (See Part 740 for a Description of All License Exceptions) 
List of Items Controlled 
 
Related Controls: 4A003, 4A004 
 




a. “Quantum Computers”; or 
 
b. Any computing device having the ability to solve a computation problem that a “digital 
computers” having an “Adjusted Peak Performance” (“APP”) exceeding 1,000 Weighted 
TeraFLOPS (WT) is capable of solving in less than 1 hour. 
 
Technical Notes: 
1. “Quantum Computers” are any computers that calculate using particles suspended in 
superposition or rely upon the principle or entanglement.
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Appendix C.  Taking Authority for Critical Technology Act (TACT Act) 
(a) Filing and Content.—In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside of the 
District of Columbia brought by and in the name of the United States and under the authority 
of the Federal Government to acquire technology, or its sub-components, or underlying 
intellectual property for the public use, the petitioner may file, with the petition or at any time 
before judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire 
the land described in the petition, declaring that the technology, sub-component(s), or 
intellectual property is taken for the use of the Government. The declaration of taking shall 
contain or have annexed to it— 
 (1) a statement of the authority under which, and the public use for which, the 
technology, its sub-components, or underlying intellectual property is taken; 
(2) a description sufficient to identify what has been taken; 
(3) a statement of the extent of what has been taken for public use; 
(4) a list of the tangible or intangible property taken, including a specific identification 
of any patented intellectual property taken;  
(5) a statement of the amount of money estimated by the acquiring authority to be just 
compensation for property taken; and 
(6) a description of the Government’s prior attempt seeking to purchase, lease, or 
otherwise gain amenable mutual access to the property at issue. 
(b) Vesting of Ownership.—On filing the declaration of taking and depositing in the court, to 
the use of the persons entitled to the compensation, the amount of the estimated compensation 
stated in the declaration— 
(1) Ownership or interest specified in the declaration vests in the Government; and 
(2) the right to just compensation for the property taken vests in the persons entitled to 
the compensation. 
(c) Compensation.— 
(1) Determination and award.— 
Compensation shall be determined and awarded in the proceeding and established by 
judgment. The judgment shall include interest, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1961, on 
the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking and 
shall be awarded from that date to the date of payment. Interest shall not be allowed on 
as much of the compensation as has been paid into the court. Amounts paid into the 
court shall not be charged with commissions or poundage. 
(2) Order to pay.— 
On application of the parties in interest, the court may order that any part of the money 
deposited in the court be paid immediately for or on account of the compensation to be 
awarded in the proceeding. 
(3) Deficiency judgment.— 
If the compensation finally awarded is more than the amount of money received by any 
person entitled to compensation, the court shall enter judgment against the Government 
for the amount of the deficiency. 
(d) Authority of Court.—On the filing of a declaration of taking, the court— 
(1) may fix the time within which, and the terms on which, the parties in possession 
shall be required to surrender possession to the petitioner; and 
(2) may make just and equitable orders to make respondent financially whole.  
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(e) Vesting Not Prevented or Delayed.— 
An appeal or undertaking given in a proceeding does not prevent or delay the vesting of 
ownership in the Government. 
 
 
